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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS APPLIED TO
CORPORATE CLIENTS
AFTER SIXTY-SIX YEARS of struggle and controversy surrounding the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients1 the United
States Supreme Court has taken one step in laying many questions to rest.
Upjohn Co. v. United States' was accepted by the Court to resolve differ-
ences in the circuits as to how far the privilege extends horizontally and
vertically within the corporate structure. This comment discusses the rami-
fications of extending the privilege to an entity which operates only through
its agents, the history of the privilege, the effect of the Upjohn decision and
the questions which remain as yet unsolved.
I. THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is a legal device by which a client may
prevent discovery of, or testimony concerning, disclosures made by the client
to his attorney and any subsequent discussion thereof. While the client may
be called upon to testify as to underlying facts within his knowledge, the privil-
ege protects those communications produced by the attorney-client relation-
ship.' Further, the lawyer may not be required to testify as to, or produce
documents of, those communications which were intended to remain con-
fidential as between legal adviser and client. The client alone has the power
to assert or waive this protection although, in practice, the attorney
may claim the privilege on her client's behalf. The privilege, however,
does not protect otherwise discoverable information simply because it is
placed in the hands of an attorney."
Wigmore has set forth a widely cited eight-element test for determining
whether matter falls within the ambit of the privilege.
1. where legal advice of any kind is sought
2. from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
3. the communications relating to that purpose
4. made in confidence
5. by the client,
6. are at his instance permanently protected
7. from disclosure by himself or the legal adviser
8. except the protection be waived.5
Thus, a client seeking legal advice, or his attorney, may not be judicially
I In United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), the Court first
recognized, by implication, that the attorney-client privilege applies to corporate clients.
2101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
3 Id. at 685.
4 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 90, at 185 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
5 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Wigmore's text con-
tains a full discussion of each element.
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forced to divulge what he and the attorney have discussed as it relates to
such legal advice. Note the emphasis on legal advice. If one who happens
to also be an attorney performs clerical or ministerial services,' or functions
primarily as a business adviser, no protection exists to prevent discovery of
communications between "counselor and client."7
The burden of proving that information should not be disclosed rests
on the party asserting the privilege. One writer suggests that the method of
meeting this burden requires an affirmative answer to two questions: First,
does the communication occur for the socially desirable purpose of secur-
ing legal advice or legal services prior to a proposed transaction; and second,
could the existence or nonexistence of the privilege significantly affect the
likelihood that the communication would be made?"' These questions go to
the essence of the rationale for the privilege. Even if answered affirmatively,
some topics are forever precluded from protection. There is no privilege
when the client discusses the contemplation of a crime, a fraud,9 or a tort."
When the privilege may be claimed, however, its protection is absolute.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE
In substance, the attorney-client privilege has been recognized since
the sixteenth century." It provides an exception to the general duty to permit
discovery of pertinent information sought by opposing counsel. Originally,
the privilege inured to the attorney as a point of honor 2 and operated to
ensure the confidentiality of evidence as does the modern work product doc-
trine. 3
Over the last 200 years, this theory has been replaced with a policy
placing the privilege in the client instead of the legal adviser." The theory
behind this shift is to encourage the client to speak freely and without ap-
*United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1968).
The presumption is, according to Wigmore, that one consults an attorney for legal advice.
A matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed for the
Sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some aspect of the
matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears to be lacking in
aspects requiring legal advice.
WroMoRE, supra, note 5, § 2296, at 566, 567.
sKoback, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. R. 339, 341 (1972).9 United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Shewfelt, 455
F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972).
'ODuplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C., 1975), affd, 540
F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
21 Evidence suggests that the privilege existed unquestioned in the reign of Queen Elizabeth
I. WioROan, supra note 5, § 2290, at 542.
'2 ld. at 543.
Is See text accompanying notes 22-23 Infra.
14 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2290, at 542-43.
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prehension to one whom he consults for advice concerning legal affairs.
"The proposition is that the detriment to justice from a power to shut off
inquiry to pertinent facts in court will be outweighed by the benefits to jus-
tice (not to the client) from a frank disclosure in the lawyer's office.""5
There is the further, practical rationale that the privilege "rests on the need
for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons
for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.""
6
These policies have been codified for lawyers in the American Bar As-
sociation Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the attorney is
ethically bound to guard the client's communications. Ethical Consideration
4-1 states:
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is
handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal
system. . . . The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to
hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facili-
tates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of
the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
For all of its positive aspects, because it runs counter to the policy of
full disclosure, the privilege has been confined within narrow boundaries.
"Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and con-
crete. . . . It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principles."'" Within the framework of
the protection rests an admonishment that its invocation be limited to those
truly privileged matters. Herein one finds the tension which breeds contro-
versy.
Questions regarding the extent of the immunity from discovery arise
in the context of pre-trial discovery as well as in-court evidence and testi-
mony. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "parties may ob-
tain discovery regarding any matter not privileged"'8 without going further
to specify what constitutes non-privileged matter. Governing the discovery
rules in this context are the Federal Rules of Evidence.19 Rule 501 states,
in pertinent part, that the privilege "shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience."20 (In actions based on state
15 McCORMICK, supra note 4, § 87 at 175 (recognized in Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464
470 (1888)).
16 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
1' WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2292, at 554.
IsFED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
19 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60 (1] at 26-225, 227 (2d ed. 1948).
20 Rule 503 dealing directly with the attorney-client privilege as well as all other rules gov-
erning specific exercises of privilege have been deleted in favor of one broad rule. Rule 503
would have codified the control group test.
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laws or claims, the state interpretation of privilege governs.)21 Legislative
deference to the courts has engendered a judicial process which seeks to
define the limits of the privilege in a manner consonant with a system favor-
ing broad disclosure. This process has achieved only some success, as the
cases that follow point out.
Before direct discussion of the corporate client's right to claim the
privilege, it is necessary for the sake of clarity to briefly distinguish the
attorney-client privilege from the work product doctrine. Upjohn deals with
both and they are related in the sense that the practitioner may advance
both as a means of protecting her clients and her work. The work product
doctrine safeguards the work of the counselor completed in preparation for
litigation which is unique to that lawyer, e.g. her mental impressions of the
case contained in notes or memoranda or her litigation strategy. The privil-
ege attaches when the client expresses confidential matters to his attorney,
regardless of whether this leads to an actual "work product." '22 The focus
differs; in one it is on the lawyer, in the other on the client. A second dis-
tinction is that the court may order that a party reveal work product upon
a showing of "good cause"' 3 but may never force the disclosure of privileged
material.
I1. THE CORPORATION AS CLIENT
In theory, only those problems inherent in the individual's claim of
privilege should attend a similar invocation by the corporation. A corpora-
tion is a statutorily created legal entity with most of the rights enjoyed by
a natural person. However, in the modern corporate structure lies the dilem-
ma, for the corporation as an entity, can act only through its employees.
The courts' concern is the scope of the privilege. In a corporation, precisely
who speaks as the corporate client? Whose communications merit protection
vertically, every employee, all management personnel, or only top manage-
ment? How far does immunity extend horizontally; to all information given
an attorney acting in that capacity? One must remember that the right to
exercise the privilege belongs to the corporation and not the individual
employee.2" If the privilege fulfills its purpose, it encourages full disclosure
21 This article is restricted to discussion of federal decisions. For state rules of privilege,
see MOORE, supra note 19, 26.60 [1] at 26-225, 227 and WiGMORE, supra note 5, § 2292,
at 554.
22 The premier case on the work product doctrine is Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
in which the Court found no privilege protection but discussed the limitation on discovery
designed to protect the attorney work product. The Hickman Court found that employees
questioned by the corporate attorney as to events leading to litigation answered the lawyer
as mere witnesses to the event and not as "clients" for whom the privilege was warranted.2 3 FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3). "Good cause" translates into a showing of substantial need
and undue hardship in obtaining the information. The holding in Upjohn points out that
this may be a very high standard when dealing with attorney notes of oral interviews.
24 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir., 1978).
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to corporate counsel and to no other. Given the corporate framework of
many individuals working together as one "client," there may be a problem
in creating a large "zone of silence" which ultimately protects matters
properly discoverable by an adversary.2 5
Since 1915 and United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 8
the Court has assumed that a corporation has the right to protect its con-
fidential statements with use of the attorney-client privilege' through its
employees. One writer had this to say about its application and the rationale
therefor: "It is the office of these men to fear for the well-being of the cor-
poration just as an individual fears for his own well-being and absent the
privilege, corporate agents would doubtless be reluctant to disclose facts
which might work against the corporation if disclosed.128 The reasoning
should be the same. "Certainly the public policy behind the attorney-client
privilege requires that an artificial person be given equal opportunity with
a natural person to communicate with its attorney."2'9 Evidently, the Court
concurred in this thinking, for while the Court did not expressly extend the
right to the railroad, it did discuss the importance of the privilege without
distinguishing between a corporation and a natural person.2
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp." was the first judicial
decision to attempt to establish the "main qualifications" for the privilege in
a setting involving a corporation. Judge Wyzanski adopted a broad view not
unlike that enunciated by Wigmore,3 2 and found that the privilege was
25See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953,
955-56 (1956).
26236 U.S. 318 (1915).
27 Only one federal case has differed and it was subsequently overturned. Judge Campbell,
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. I11. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) denied defendant corporation the right to limit discovery on
the ground that a corporation is barred from asserting the attorney-client privilege. He
found the right to be strictly personal and hence available only to natural persons. Further,
he found the structure of corporations prevents full compliance with the requirement of
confidentiality. In reversing, the court of appeals, sitting en banc, held that the privilege is
not personal but a legal device used to advance the larger interests of justice. The court
also specifically declined to suggest appropriate guidelines for the application of the privilege
to corporate clients. 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
23 Comment, The Lmvyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of
Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235, 241 (1961).
29 D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 477 (1964).
30236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
31 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
3"-'The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to be-
come a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney is
informed (a) by the client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law (ii) legal service or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
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available to protect many of the 800 exhibits sought in discovery, because
they were products of the attorney-client relationship existing between the
corporate counsel and a number of defendant's employees acting on behalf
of the corporate client.3
The "control group" test, the first to limit application of the privilege
on the basis that the client was a corporation, came out of City of Philadel-
phia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." Judge Kirkpatrick reduced the num-
ber of those who may claim the privilege with regard to their discourse with
corporate counsel. He found that the United Shoe decision conflicted with
the holding in Hickman v. Taylor 5 in that it protected not only truly privil-
eged communications but also statements by employees who spoke, not as
representatives of the company, but as "witnesses." The result was a situ-
ation wherein the employee gave information to counsel for use in the pursuit
of a claim of another client-the corporation. " The control group test
provides that:
if the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may
be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the
advice of the attorney . . . then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the privil-
ege would apply. In all other cases the employee would be merely giv-
ing information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in
the corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on
the advice. 7
Under this narrow test the judge granted protection only to those statements
emanating from the highest management level. This test has been specific-
ally overturned in Upjohn where it was criticized as follows: "In the cor-
porate context, however, it will frequently be employees beyond the control
group . . .who will possess the information needed by the corporation's
lawyers . . . .The control group test . . . frustrates the very purpose
of the privilege." 38
Harper & Row Publishers Inc., v. Decker" also found the control group
a3 Judge Wyzanski refused the privilege to the documents held by the United Shoes patent
law department because those in that department were either not attorneys or not acting
as legal counsel.
84 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). This is the most widely accepted test. See Jarvis, Inc.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286 (D. Colo. 1979).
85 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
36 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
37 Id.
as 101 S. Ct. 677, 683-84 (1981).
39 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), af'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971), rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
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test inadequate. As an alternative, the Harper & Row court applied a "sub-
ject matter" test substantially broader than its predecessor.
An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the em-
ployee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors...
and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is
the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment."°
This test opens up the use of the privilege vertically within a corporation.
Any employee may function as the "client" given a protected subject mat-
ter and a directive from a superior. Conceivably, all information concern-
ing the performance of the employees duties could fall within a privileged
area once a lawyer's advice is sought. It is for this reason that detractors
find the test too broad"1 and antithetical to the policy of open discovery.
They suggest that a corporation basing its claim of privilege on the subject
matter test will be able to hide information and documentary evidence sim-
ply by transmitting these to an attorney."2
Dissatisfaction with the subject matter test has engendered two hybrid
tests which have narrowed the application of the Harper & Row standard.
Diversified Industries v. Meredith"3 presents the first. The essential elements
in the Diversified approach are: first, the communication must be made for
the purpose of securing legal advice; second, the employee making the
communication must do so at the direction of his corporate superior; third,
the superior must have so directed the employee so the corporation could
secure legal advice; fourth, the subject matter of the communication must
be within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and fifth, the com-
munication must not be disseminated beyond those persons who, because
of the corporate structure, need to know its contents. The court expressly
places the burden of proving the existence of these criteria on the party
asserting the privilege." Of note is the explicit burden of proving confi-
dentiality within the corporate framework and the emphasis placed on cor-
porate need for legal advice. On behalf of its test, the court explains that
routine reports fall outside the standards for exclusion because they will
either be seen by those who do not need to know of their content or will
1oId. at 491-92.
I1 See, e.g., United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
*2E.g., United States v. Upjohn, 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded,.
101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
's 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). For an extended discussion of Diversified, see Note,
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 J. CORP. L. 226 (1978); 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
413 (1979); Note, Alternative Test for Attachment of the Attorney-Client Privilege to the
Corporate Client, 179 WAsH. U.L.Q. 265.
572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
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be for a purpose unrelated to legal advice, 5 thus remedying the major pitfall
in the Harper & Row test.
One of the more sensitive issues in determining whether the privilege
attaches revolves around the characterization of "legal advice." In Diversified,
a strong dissent urged rejection of the privilege applied by the majority
because the information in question may have been generated in the pursuit
of business advice." In an ongoing corporation the distinction may be
difficult to pinpoint and forced disclosure of a business aspect of a com-
munication can reveal pertinent facts related to strictly legal aspects. A
succinct "yardstick" provides:
Legal advice should remain protected along with "nonlegal consider-
ations" discussed between client and counsel that are relevant to that
consultation, but when the ultimate decision then requires the exercise
of business judgment and when what were relevant nonlegal consid-
erations incidental to the formulation of legal advice emerge as the
business reasons for and against a course of action, those business
reasons considered among executives are not privileged."
Regardless of the criticisms of the dissent, Diversified's modification of the
test used in Harper & Row has emerged as distinctive."8
A second hybrid arose in In re Ampicillin"9 which clearly draws from
both the control group and subject matter approaches and sets out four re-
quirements:
1 ) The particular employee or representative of the corporation must
have made a communication of information which was reasonably
believed to be necessary to the decision-making process concern-
ing a problem on which legal advice was sought;
2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of se-
curing legal advice;
3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee
must have been related to the performance by the employee of the
duties of his employment; and
4) The communication must have been a confidential one [made with
the intention that it would be kept confidential]."0
Elements one and three reflect the compromise position of Judge Richey.
45Sd.
46 d. at 614 (Henley, J. dissenting).
47 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 506, 517 (D. Conn. 1977).
4S Markey, Privileged Communications Between Counsel and the Client, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
565, 572 (1979).
49 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
50 Id, at 385 (emphasis in original).
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He compares his test with that of Diversified, noting that his is the more nar-
row "in that it requires a close relationship between the communication and
a decision on a legal problem (or at least a reasonable belief of such relation-
ship) rather than a request by a superior to an employee that the com-
munication be made."'" This is a balancing test necessitating analysis of
both the subject and the context. Control group members are free to draw
upon lower level personnel when doing so is important for the proper
decision, but it must be directly connected to the subject matter of the
employee's job. This approach protects those matters used to procure legal
advice upon which a course of conduct will be devised without protecting
all information simply because it falls within the employee's job performance.
III. THE IMPACT OF Upjohn Co. v. United States
Against this background of differences" stands the Upjohn decision,
eagerly awaited by corporate counsel across the country.53 Unfortunately,
the case represents one giant sidestep of the problems inherent in the ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege to corporations, even though the
desire to resolve the conflicts in this area was the impetus for the Court's
acceptance of the case. While paying tribute to the need for workable
guidelines,' the Court declined to "lay down a broad rule or series of rules
to govern all conceivable future questions in this area."55
Upjohn concerned the protection of an in-house investigation of possi-
bly illegal payments discovered during an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
audit. 6 The Chairman of the Board requested that corporate counsel inter-
view, personally and via questionnaire, those employees with access to rele-
vant information so the attorneys could advise Upjohn concerning the pay-
ments. Those interviewed were instructed that the matter was "highly con-
fidential" and a cover letter stated that the purpose of the investigation was
to ensure that any future expenditures would be "proper and legal."'"
The IRS became aware of the inquiry after Upjohn voluntarily sent them
a summary report of the payments. They received more information from
the Securities and Exchange Commission to whom Upjohn had also re-
51id. at 385 n. 8.
52 The cases discussed here represent only those most important in the development of
the privilege. For a compilation of other relevant decisions, see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 241
(1964) and Annot., 9 A.L.R. Fed. 685 (1971).
53See, e.g., Markey, supra note 48, at 590.
54The Court stated, "But if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served,
the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected." 101 S. Ct. 677, 684 (1981).
55 Id. at 681.
56 See the lower court's opinion, 600 F.2d 1223, 1224 (6th Cir. 1978)t r n"4 an rcman ed
101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
57 101 S. Ct. 677, 685 (1981).
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ported. Upjohn then submitted details of $700,000 worth of payments
which, the company concluded, might have an impact on Upjohn's tax bill.
When the IRS insisted upon examining the documents collected by counsel
pertaining to the remaining $3,700,000 in order to satisfy themselves that
no further tax liability remained, the company claimed that the documents
were privileged. This litigation ensued.
The district court adopted the magistrate's finding that the privilege
had been waived and the work product doctrine was inapplicable and ord-
ered compliance with the IRS summons.5' Defendant appealed but found
only limited relief. The court of appeals adopted the control group test,
reasoning that "corporations, unlike individuals, are organized in such a
way that responsibilities, and the information needed to fulfill the respon-
sibilities, are delegated and compartmentalized.... It is only the senior man-
agement, guiding and integrating the several operations, which can be said
to possess an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole."' 9 The court
excluded that matter communicated by members of the control group and
affirmed the lower court order as to disclosure of the other information.
The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the control group test: "Such
a view . . .overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only
the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and in-
formed advice."' Thus, lower level employees merit protection when they
possess the facts necessary for full legal counsel and sound decision-making
by the corporation. Because actions of the agent may be the basis for the
litigation, a non-control group person could represent the sole source of
corporate access to facts useful in pursuit of a claim or defense. Unless the
lawyer can elicit information from lower level employees, "he may find it
extremely difficult if not impossible to determine what happened."'"
The Court undertook a factual analysis of the events in Upjohn's
investigation and found that the answers to the questionnaires and the
notes of personal interviews with employees were protected by the attorney-
client privilege."2
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such as
those involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position
than if the communications had never taken place. The privilege only
'600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1978).
59 Id. at 1228.
60 101 S. Ct. 677, 683 (1981) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)
and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
61 Id. at 684 (quoting Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir.
1978)).
In Id. at 685.
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protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure
of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney."
The Court refused to propose a test that would allow a uniform ap-
proach to the problem of the corporate privilege, stating that to do so would
"violate the spirit of F.R.E. 501."' Instead the Court urged a case-by-case
examination of the facts." However, scrutiny of the Court's analysis in pro-
tecting the Upjohn documents lends support to the test of Diversified."8 The
elements proffered by the Court as evidence of communications deserving
access to the privilege closely align with the elements of the Diversified test.
The Court found these facts to be relevant:
The communications at issue were made by Upjohn employees to coun-
sel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors
[element 2] in order to secure legal advice from counsel. [elements 1
and 3] . . . The communications concerned matters within the scope
of employee's corporate duties [element 4] . . . . mhe communica-
tions were considered "highly confidential" when made . . . and have
been kept confidential by the company. [element 5]"T
Thus, taken all together, the Upjohn opinion appears to accept the test used
in Diversified as a means of approaching any given case.
Chief Justice Burger concurred, stating that "a communication is priv-
ileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee speaks at the
direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or pro-
posed conduct within the scope of employment." 8 This is broader in scope
than the majority holding.
The concurring opinion differs further in that Burger felt that the
Court has a duty to forge new ground in this area. The Burger rule of
thumb is that a communication is privileged when the attorney is authorized
by management to inquire into the subject and is seeking information to as-
sist counsel in performing any of the following functions:
(a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or would
bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of
that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions
that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.6 '
63 Id.
64 See FED. R. Evm. 501 and text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
e5 101 S. Ct. 677, 686 (1981). Accord American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211
F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
6 6 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
07 101 S. Ct. 677, 685 (1981).
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Different from all other proposals, the Burger opinion focuses not on
the acts or intent of the employee or corporation but rather on the reasons
that the attorney would require the information. This focus is nonetheless
in accord with the rationale and holding of Burger's brethren provided that
the requirements of confidentiality and scope of employment subject matter
are implicit. If a lawyer needs information to fulfill the strictly legal duties
on behalf of the corporation as specified in the concurrence, then that in-
formation is immune from discovery. One problem may be that in order to
prove that the privilege covers the matters in the hands of the attorney, the
legal adviser will have to explain why he required it, which opens the door
to a form of discovery.
Left undiscussed by the Court is the issue of waiver. When has the
corporation given up the right to assert the privilege, and who has the power
to do so? Even given a case-by-case framework, the Court could have es-
tablished a guide to this aspect of the privilege. The magistrate's decision
relied upon by the district court found a waiver. Considering the fact that
corporations are beset with a variety of governmental entities demanding
information, the question of what constitutes a waiver, and how much may
be revealed before one must tell all, becomes significant.
Another question that arises, though not directly on point in Upjohn,
concerns stockholders' derivative suits. General guidance as to the extent
of the privilege may clarify how far into the protection of the privilege go
the rights of the shareholders in their suits on behalf of the corporation itself.
One court had held that the protection is subject to evidence offered by the
shareholders as to why the privilege should not be invoked."'
All in all Upjohn is a disappointment. The courts and counsel are left
to struggle with unknown parameters as they have in the past. Certainly
the removal of the control group option is of some benefit, and the Court's
examination of the facts gives some hints as to the analysis expected in the
future. Nonetheless, the attorney-client privilege remains in a legal limbo
with regard to its application to the corporate client.
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